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NOTE 
INTELLECTUAL SLAVERY?: THE DOCTRINE 
OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE OF TRADE 
SECRETS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, lawsuits filed by employers 
seeking to prevent valued employees from taking positions 
with their competitors have become increasingly frequent.l In 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,2 the Seventh Circuit gave further 
stimulus to this trend by holding that a softdrink executive 
would inevitably disclose the softdrink company's trade secrets 
and other confidential information if he were to work for the 
company's competitor in a comparable position.3 Moreover, 
because the PepsiCo court upheld an injunction prohibiting the 
executive from taking the position rather than simply prohibit-
ing his disclosure of trade secrets,4 the court's application of 
the inevitable disclosure theory effectively turns confidentiality 
agreements into non-compete agreements.5 Based on this deci-
sion, employers seeking to prevent an employee from leaving 
need no longer risk the judicial disfavor and scrutiny tradition-
ally experienced in suits to enforce non-compete agreements.6 
1. DiBoise and Berger, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 20 NEW MATTER 
28 (1995). 




6. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 13.02 at 13-12 (1988). Modern 
decisions emphasize the importance of employee mobility. As observed by one 
court, "our free economy is based upon competition," and workers cannot be com-
pelled to erase from their minds all of the general skills, knowledge, and acquain-
717 
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PepsiCo is also important because it is the first Illinois 
case to successfully treat inevitable disclosure7 as threatened 
misappropriationS under the Illinois Trade Secret Act.9 The 
inevitable disclosure theory has traditionally been distin-
guished from threatened misappropriation on the basis of in-
tent. lO A finding of inevitable disclosure does not require proof 
of intent, in contrast to threatened misappropriation. ll Wher-
ever the Uniform Trade Secret Act has been adopted, federal 
and state courts have struggled with whether inevitable disclo-
tances and the overall experience acquired during employment upon taking another 
job. Kalnitz v. Ion Exchange Products, Inc., 276 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ill. App. 1972). 
Accordingly, noncompetition clauses in employment contracts are strictly construed 
against the employer. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 13-12; See also DiBoise and 
Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2 NATL L.J. C12-14 
(1995). 
7. Under the inevitable disclosure theory, the ex-employer seeks an injunction 
prohibiting employment, not just disclosure of trade secrets. This is based on three 
factors: (1) whether the fonner employer and the new employer are competitors; 
(2) whether the employee's new position is comparable to his or her fonner posi-
tion; and (3) the efficacy of steps taken by the new employer to prevent the al-
leged misappropriation of trade secrets. If an employee changes jobs but remains 
in the same profession or trade, she may find it impossible to avoid drawing upon 
the skills and experience she developed at her previous jobs. Thus, disclosure may 
become a nearly inevitable event even though the employee does not intend to 
appropriate her fonner employers' trade secrets. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 
at ,28.; See generally Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: 
Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519, (1988); 
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268. 
8. The Illinois Trade Secret Act provides for an injunction prohibiting the 
threat of misappropriation of trade secrets. This is typically satisfied by showing 
an intent to disclose trade secrets. In contrast, the inevitable disclosure theory 
does not consider the intent of the ex-employee. Illinois Trade Secret Act, CH 765 
§ 1065/2; See also, DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28. 
9. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263; Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 
707 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (this was the first Illinois case contemplating the 
inevitable disclosure theory in a threatened misappropriation cause of action); 
Illinois Trade Secret Act, CH 765 § 1065/2. Illinois, as well as twenty one states, 
including California have adopted the Unifonn Trade Secret Act. JAGER, TRADE 
SECRETS LAw § 13.02 at 13-12. 
10. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28; See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIO-
NARY, 1480 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining "threat" as a "communicated intent to inflict 
hann on any person or property"); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 840 (3rd Edi-
tion)(defining "threat" as an "expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, or 
evil"). 
11. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28. 
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sure is an appropriate ground on which to base an order en-
joining employment. 12 Because California has adopted the 
V.T.S.A. and because PepsiCo was a fact intensive analysis, 
this decision will affect California law.13 
This note will discuss the Seventh Circuit's analysis and 
the potential impact of the PepsiCo decision. The author will 
ultimately conclude that application of the inevitable disclosure 
theory in actions to prevent employers from working for com-
petitors creates a substantial risk for employees, impedes their 
mobility, limits their options and strips them of their bargain-
ing power. 14 Additionally, this note will argue that general 
acceptance of the inevitable disclosure theory could have a 
serious impact on a wide range of industries, stifling the dis-
semination of general technical knowledge and economic 
growth. 15 
II. FACTS 
William Redmond, Jr. (hereinafter "Redmond") worked for 
PepsiCo, a soft drink manufacturer, for ten years in the capaci-
ty of a managerial employee. IS In June 1993, Redmond be-
came the general manager of the Northern California Business 
Unit. 17 One year later, Redmond was promoted to general 
manager of the business unit which covered all of California. IS 
Redmond's relatively high position at PepsiCo gave him 
access to inside information and trade secrets.19 Redmond was 
12. [d. 
13. Interview with Thomas J. McCarthy, Attorney at Law, in San Francisco, 
CA (Nov. 15 1995).; The 1979 meeting of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, after ten years of study, approved a Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act. The Uniform Trade Secret Act has become law in twenty-one states. 
The California Uniform Act became law on January 1, 1985. The Dlinois Trade 
Secrets Act became law in 1988. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 3.04 at 3-23 
(1988). 
14. See infra notes 117-140 and accompanying text. 
15. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non·Compete Pacts, 2 
NAT'L L.J. C12 (1995). 




19. [d. Trade Secrets are business information that is the subject of reasonable 
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privy to PepsiCo's strategic plans, operational innovations, and 
marketing decisions.20 To guard against the possibility of dis-
closure, PepsiCo required Redmond, like other PepsiCo employ-
ees, to sign a confidentiality agreement.21 
In May, 1994, Quaker began courting Redmond.22 
Throughout this time, Redmond kept his negotiations with 
Quaker secret from his employers at PepsiCo.23 On October, 
23, 1994, Quaker offered Redmond the position of Vice Presi-
dent-On Premise Sales for Gatorade.24 Redmond did not ac-
cept the offer but continued to negotiate for more money.25 On 
November 8, 1994, Quaker extended Redmond a written offer 
for the position of Vice President-Field Operations for 
Gatorade, and Redmond accepted.26 
Later that same day, Redmond called William Bensyl, the 
Senior Vice President of Human Resources for PepsiCo.27 
Redmond told Bensyl that he had had an offer from Quaker to 
become the Chief Operating Officer of the combined Gatorade 
efforts to preserve confidentiality and has value because it is not generally known 
in the trade. MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 344 
(1991). 
20. Id. at 1265. For example, knowing the pricing architecture would allow a 
competitor to anticipate PepsiCo's pricing moves and underbid PepsiCo strategically 
whenever and wherever the competitor so desired. Pursuant to the attack plans, 
PepsiCo dedicates extra funds to supporting its brands against other brand in 
selected markets. The new delivery system could give PepsiCo an advantage over 
its competitors in negotiations with retailer over shelf space and merchandising. 
PepsiCo feared Redmond would disclose his intimate knowledge of these plans. Id. 
at 1265-1266. 
21. [d. at 1264. The confidentiality agreement stated in relevant part that 
Redmond would not disclose at any time, to anyone other than officers or employ-
ees of PepsiCo, or make use of, confidential information relating to the business of 
PepsiCo which is not generally known or available to the public or recognized as 
standard practices. [d. 
22. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. The facts of this case lay against a backdrop of 
fierce beverage-industry competition between Quaker and PepsiCo, especially in 
sports drinks and new age drinks. Quaker's sports drink, "Gatorade," is the domi-
nant brand in its market niche. PepsiCo introduced its Gatorade rival, "All Sport," 






27. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. 
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and Snapple company.28 Redmond further stated that he had 
not yet accepted that offer.29 Redmond also misstated his situ-
ation to a number of his PepsiCo colleagues, reporting that he 
was leaning "60/40" in favor of accepting the new position 
when he had in fact already accepted.30 
On November 10, 1994, Redmond resigned from 
PepsiCo.31 PepsiCo immediately informed Redmond that it 
was considering legal action against him for threat of misap-
propriation of trade secrets and breach of the confidentiality 
agreement.32 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Six days later, on November 16, 1994, PepsiCo filed suit 
seeking a temporary restraining order to enjoin Redmond from 
assuming his duties at Quaker and to prevent him from dis-
closing trade secrets and confidential information to his new 
employer.33 The district court granted the injunction that 
same day.34 However, two days later the court dissolved the 
order sua sponte35 because it found that PepsiCo failed to 
meet its burden of establishing that it would suffer irreparable 
harm.3s 
PepsiCo next sought a preliminary injunction against 
Redmond and Quaker.37 From November 23, 1994 to Decem-
28. Id. Quaker purchased Snapple beverage Corp., a large new-age-drink mak-
er, in late 1994. PepsiCo's products have about half of the new age drink market 
share. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. The colleagues included Craig Weatherup, President and Chief Execu-
tive Officer, and Brenda Barnes, Chief Operating Officer and Redmond's immediate 
superior. Id. 
31. Id at 1265. 
32. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1265. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. Id.; See e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 993 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining "Sua 
sponte" as voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion; of its own will or motion). 
36. Id. The court found that PepsiCo's fears about Redmond were based upon 
a mistaken understanding of his new position at Quaker and that the likelihood 
that Redmond would improperly reveal any confidential information did not rise 
above mere speculation. Id. 
37. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1265. 
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ber 1, 1994, the district court conducted a preliminary injunc-
tion hearing. 3s At the hearing, PepsiCo listed confidential in-
formation and trade secrets that Redmond was privy to, and 
which PepsiCo desired to protect from misappropriation.39 
Having shown Redmond's intimate knowledge of PepsiCo's 
1995 plans, PepsiCo argued that Redmond would inevitably 
disclose that information to Quaker in his new position.40 
Redmond and Quaker countered that Redmond's primary 
initial duties at Quaker would be to integrate Snapple and 
Gatorade distribution.41 Additionally, they argued that this 
integration would be conducted according to a pre-existing 
plan.42 Therefore, Redmond asserted that his special knowl-
edge of PepsiCo's strategies would be irrelevant.43 PepsiCo 
responded that no preexisting business plan existed.44 
38. [d. 
39. [d. First, PepsiCo identified it's "Strategic Plans," an annually revised 
document that contains PepsiCo's plans to compete, its financial goals, and its 
strategies for manufacturing, production, marketing, packaging, and distribution for 
the coming three years. The Strategic Plan derives much of its value from the fact 
that it is secret and competitors cannot anticipate PepsiCo's next moves. Second, 
PepsiCo pointed to their "Annual Operating Plan" (AOP) as a trade secret. The 
AOP bears a label that reads "Private and Confidential-Do Not Reproduce" and is 
considered highly confidential by PepsiCo managers. Knowing PepsiCo's pricing 
architecture would allow a competitor to anticipate their pricing moves and under-
bid them strategically whenever and wherever a competitor so desired. PepsiCo 
also showed that Redmond had intimate knowledge of their attack plans for specif-
ic markets. Finally, PepsiCo offered evidence of their trade secrets regarding inno-
vation in its selling and delivery systems. Under this plan, PepsiCo was to test a 
new delivery system that could give them an advantage over its competitors in 
negotiations with retailers over shelf space and merchandising. [d. 
40. [d. at 1266. At the new position, PepsiCo argued, Redmond would have 
substantial input as to Gatorade and Snapple pricing, costs, margins, distribution 
systems, products, packaging and marketing, and could give Quaker an unfair 
advantage in its upcoming skirmishes with PepsiCo. [d. 
41. [d. Redmond and Quaker argued that his new position consisted of inte-
grating Gatorade and Snapple distribution and then managing that distribution as 
well as the promotion, marketing and sales of these products. They further assert-
ed Redmond's knowledge was irrelevant because PepsiCo and Quaker distribute 
their products in entirely different ways. [d. 
42. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1266. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. As of November, 1994, the plan to integrate Gatorade and Snapple 
distribution constituted of a single distributorship agreement and a two-page "con-
tract terms summary." Such a basic plan would not lend itself to widespread ap-
plication among the over 300 independent Snapple distributors. PepsiCo further 
argued that Snapple's 1995 marketing and promotion plans had not necessarily 
been completed prior to Redmond's joining Quaker. Consequently, the plans were 
6
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Redmond would, therefore, likely have input in creating those 
plans, and if he did, Redmond would inevitably be making 
decisions with PepsiCo's strategic plans in mind.45 Moreover, 
PepsiCo's continued, diverging testimony made it difficult to 
determine exactly what Redmond would be doing at Quaker.46 
Finally, PepsiCo asserted that Redmond would have an impor-
tant position in the Gatorade hierarchy, and PepsiCo's trade 
secrets would inevitably and necessarily influence strategic 
decisions.4.7 
On December, 15, 1994, the district court issued an order 
enjoining Redmond from assuming his position at Quaker 
through May 1995, and permanently enjoining him from using 
or disclosing any PepsiCo trade secrets or confidential informa-
tion.4.8 The district court found that Redmond would inevita-
bly disclose PepsiCo's trade secrets at his new job and that 
inevitable disclosure could be enjoined under Illinois statutory 
and common law.49 The court also emphasized that 
Redmond's lack of forthrightness had led the court to believe 
the threat of misappropriation was real. 50 
On April 6, 1995, Redmond and Quaker appealed the in-
junction.51 Both parties stipulated that the primary issue on 
appeal was whether the district court correctly concluded that 
PepsiCo had a reasonable likelihood of success on its various 
claims for trade secret misappropriation and breach of confi-
dentiality agreement. 52 
up for reevaluation. Redmond would therefore have an input in remaking these 
plans. Id. 
45.Id. 
46. Id. Redmond described his job as "managing the entire sales effort of 
Gatorade at the field level, possibly including strategic planning," and at least at 
one point considered his job to be equivalent to that of a Chief Operating Officer. 
Id. 
47. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267. 
48. Id. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. The lack of forthrightness referred to, which included Redmond's activi-
ties before accepting his job and in his testimony, was a factor leading the court 
to believe PepsiCo's claim. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267. PepsiCo satisfied the other requirements for a 
preliminary injunction: whether PepsiCo has an adequate remedy at law or will be 
irreparably harmed if the injunction does not issue; whether the threatened injury 
7
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N. BACKGROUND OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE IN 
ILLINOIS 
The theory of inevitable disclosure has developed under 
two distinct bodies of law.53 First, the concept of inevitable 
disclosure is embodied in state statutes. 54 Second, the concept 
of inevitable disclosure is supported under case law.55 In 
PepsiCo, the Seventh Circuit considered both statutory and 
case law when deciding whether a plaintiff may prove a claim 
for trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that 
defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to rely 
on the plaintiffs trade secrets. 56 
A. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
In 1979, following ten years of study, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter "U.T.S.A.").57 Accord-
ing to the committee's prefatory note, the major impetus be-
hind the draft was the confused state of trade secret common 
law.58 As of 1995, the U.T.S.A. has been enacted in twenty-
one states. 59 
to PepsiCo outweighs the threatened hann the injunction may inflict on Quaker 
and Redmond; and whether the granting of the preliminary injunction will disser-
vice the public interest. Quaker and Redmond did not challenge these findings on 
appeal. 
The remainder of this comment will be confined to the trade secret misap-
propriation cause of action. Both claims are decided based on the existence of the 
inevitable disclosure theory. Once the court finds in favor of PepsiCo on the issue 
of trade secret misappropriation, it necessarily finds in favor of PepsiCo on the 
issue of breach of Redmond's confidentiality agreement. Once established that 
Redmond's position at Quaker would cause him to disclose trade secrets, it follows 
that he would necessarily be forced to breach his agreement not to disclose confi-
dential infonnation acquired while employed at PepsiCo. Id. 
53. See generally Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: 
Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1988); See also 
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1263. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
56. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. 
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The Illinois Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter "LT.S.A."), 
patterned after the D.T.S.A., was enacted in 1988.60 The theo-
ry of inevitable disclosure is not addressed in either the 
D.T.S.A. or the LT.S.A.61 To establish that a defendant im-
properly used trade secrets pursuant to the LT.S.A., a claimant 
must show that the secret was sensitive, misappropriated, and 
used in the appropriator's business.62 Although the plain lan-
guage of both the D.T.S.A. and the I.T.S.A. does not provide 
protection against inevitable disclosure, some courts have held 
that the theory of inevitable disclosure does provide an ade-
quate ground for a suit to enjoin the inevitable disclosure of 
trade secrets.63 The crucial difference between traditional 
60. [d. at 3-23. 
61. See Illinois Trade Secrets Act, IL ST CH 765, § 1065 et seq. 
62. [d. 
63. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267; IL ST CH 765, § 1065 et seq. The I.T.S.A. does 
provide the following useful information. 
1. Misappropriation means: 
i. acquisition of a trade secret of a person by anoth-
er person who knows or has reason to know that 
the trade secret was acquired by improper means; 
ii. or disclosure or use of a trade secret of a person 
without express or implied consent by another per-
son who; 
I. used improper means to acquire knowledge 
of the trade secret or; 
II. at the time of disclosure or use, knew or 
had reason to know that knowledge of the 
trade secret was: 
A. derived from or through a person 
who utilized improper means to acquire it; 
B. acquired under circumstances giving 
rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit 
its use; or 
C. derived from or through a person 
who owed a duty to the person seeking relief 
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
III. before a material change of position, 
knew or had reason to know that it was a 
trade secret and that knowledge of it had 
been acquired by accident or mistake. 
2. Injunctions: 
i. actual or threatened misappropriation may be 
enjoined. 
IL ST CH 765, § 1065/2 (b). 
9
Edelstein: Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
726 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:717 
threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclosure is that 
the latter may be enjoined without proof of intent to dis-
close.64 
B. ILLINOIS CASE LAw ADDRESSING INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 
The issue of threatened or inevitable misappropriation of 
trade secrets has long been the basis for tension in trade secret 
law.65 This tension becomes particularly exacerbated when a 
plaintiff sues to prevent not the actual misappropriation of 
trade secrets, but the mere threat that the misappropriation 
will occur.66 While the I.T.S.A. clearly permits a court to en-
join the threat of misappropriation of trade secrets, neither 
Illinois courts nor the Seventh Circuit has determined what 
constitutes threatened or inevitable misappropriation.67 In-
deed, only two cases in the Seventh Circuit address the issue: 
Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp. (hereinafter 
"Teradyne") and AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker (hereinafter 
"AMP).68 AMP discusses inevitable disclosure under the com-
mon law, and Teradyne discusses inevitable disclosure under 
the I.T.S.A..69 
1. Inevitable Disclosure under the Common Law 
AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker was the first and only Illinois 
case to address the theory, of inevitable disclosure under the 
common law.70 However, since the I.T.S.A. codifies the com-
mon law, AMP continues to represent the standard under 
Illinois's current statutory scheme.71 
64. DiBoise and Berger, supra note 1 at 28. 
65. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id.; Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 
(1989); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, (1987). 
69. Id. at 1268-9. 
70. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.; AMP, 823 F.2d 1199. 
71. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. AMP predates the I.T.S.A.. The I.T.S.A. abolish-
es any common law remedies or authority contrary to its own terms. The I.T.S.A. 
does not, however, represent a major deviation from the Illinois common law of 
unfair trade practices. Id. 
10
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In AMP, the court denied a preliminary injunction on the 
grounds that the plaintiff, AMP, had failed to show either the 
existence of any trade secrets or the likelihood that the defen-
dant, Fleischhacker, a former AMP employee, would compro-
mise those secrets or any other confidential business informa-
tion.72 AMP, a company that produced electrical and electron-
ic connection devices, argued that Fleischhacker's new position 
at AMP's competitor would inevitably lead him to compromise 
AMP's trade secrets regarding the manufacture of connec-
tors.73 In rejecting that argument, the court emphasized that 
the mere fact that a person assumed a similar position at a 
competitor does not, without more, make it inevitable that he 
will use or disclose trade secret information so as to demon-
strate irreparable injury.74 However, the court noted that 
while the facts of AMP were insufficient to state a claim for 
threatened misappropriation under an inevitable disclosure 
theory, inevitable disclosure would, nonetheless, be a proper 
ground for an injunction to protect trade secrets under a more 
compelling set of facts.75 
2. Inevitable Disclosure Under the I.T.S.A. 
Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications was the first case 
to address the theory of inevitable disclosure under the 
I.T.S.A.76 In Teradyne, Teradyne, Inc. alleged that a competi-
tor, Clear Communications (hereinafter "Clear"), had lured 
employees away from Teradyne and had intended to employ 
them in the same field. 77 The Teradyne court observed that 
threatened misappropriation can be enjoined under Illinois law 
where there is a high degree of probability of inevitable and 
immediate use of trade secrets.78 The court held, however, 
that Teradyne's complaint failed to state a claim because 
Teradyne did not allege that defendants had in fact threatened 
to use Teradyne's secrets or that they would inevitably do SO.79 
72. AMP, 823 F.2d at 1203. 
73. [d. at 1199, 1201. 
74. [d. at 1207. 
75. [d.; PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. 
76. [d. at 1268; Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. 353. 
77. AMP, 823 F.2d at 354. 
78. [d. at 356. 
79. [d. 
11
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The Teradyne court noted that Teradyne's claims would 
have avoid summary judgmentSO had it properly alleged inevi-
table disclosure by including an allegation that (1) Clear in-
tended to use Teradyne's trade secrets, that (2) the former 
Teradyne employees had disavowed their confidentiality agree-
ments with Teradyne, or (3) an allegation that Clear could not 
operate without Teradyne's secrets.81 However, the mere stat-
ing of defendants' actions, which included working for 
Teradyne, knowing its business, leaving its business, hiring 
employees from Teradyne and entering the same field, did not 
constitute a claim of threatened misappropriation.82 The court 
held that merely alleging that the plaintifi's fear that the de-
fendant competitor could misuse plaintifi's secrets did not 
adequately support a claim of inevitable disclosure under the 
I.T.S.A.s3 
v. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis of PepsiCo by dis-
cussing the fierce competition between PepsiCo and Quaker 
within the beverage industry.84 Although Quaker's sports 
drink, "Gatorade," is the dominant brand in its market 
niche,s5 PepsiCo attempted to break into the market by intro-
ducing its Gatorade rival, "All Sport," in March and April of 
1994.86 To date, sales of All Sport have lagged far behind 
those of Gatorade.s7 Quaker also led the market in sales of 
new age drinks,ss and, although PepsiCo had attempted to get 
ahead by entering that market through joint ventures with the 
Thomas J. Lipton Company and Ocean Spray Cranberries, 
80. FED. R. elY. P. 12(b)(6). Federal motion to dismiss an action for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. 
81. Id. at 355. 
82.Id. 
83. Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 357. The court stated that "It may be that little 
more is needed, but falling a little short is still falling short." Id. 
84. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263-1264. 
85. Id. at 1264. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. "New age drink" is a catch-all category for non-carbonated soft drinks 
and includes such beverages as ready-to-drink tea products and fruit drinks. 
Sports drinks may also fall under the new age drink heading. Id. 
12
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Inc., Quaker stifled that strategy by purchasing Snapple Bev-
erage Corp. in late 1994.89 
After laying the industry backdrop, the court factually 
analyzed PepsiCo's case.90 First, the court found that PepsiCo 
presented substantial evidence that Redmond possessed exten-
sive and intimate knowledge about PepsiCo's 1995 strategic 
goals for their sports drinks and new age drinks.91 Additional-
ly, the court pointed out that even if Redmond could somehow 
refrain from relying on that information, as he promised he 
would, his lack of truthfulness about his intentions to leave 
PepsiCo made his assurances less than comforting.92 The 
court concluded that unless Redmond possessed an "uncanny" 
ability to compartmentalize information, he would necessarily 
be making decisions about Gatorade and Snapple by relying on 
his knowledge of PepsiCo's trade secrets.93 
In reaching its conclusion, the PepsiCo court referred to 
the Illinois Trade Secrets Act which provides that a court may 
enjoin the actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade 
secret.94 The court further remarked that the question of 
threatened or inevitable misappropriation creates a friction in 
trade secret law confronting the sometimes opposing teams, 
employee and employer.95 Trade secret law serves to protect 
standards of commercial morality and to encourage invention 
and innovation while still maintaining public interest in free 
and open competition in the manufacture and sale of unpatent-
ed goods.96 Yet, the court noted, that same law should not 
prevent workers from pursuing their livelihoods when they 
89. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. PepsiCo's products have about half the relevant 
market share. Additionally, both PepsiCo and Quaker saw 1995 as an important 
year for their productsPepsiCo had developed extensive plans to increase its mar-
ket presence, while Quaker was trying to solidify its lead by integrating Gatorade 
and Snapple distribution. Id. at 1264-67. 
90. Id. at 1264-67. 
91. Id. at 1264. Sports drinks are also called "isotonics," implying that they 
contain the same salt concentration as human blood, and "electrolytes," implying 
that the substances contained in the drink have dissociated into ions. Id. 
92. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267. 
93. [d. at 1269. 
94. Id. at 1268. 
95. Id. at 1268. 
96. Id. (citing JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAw § IL.03 at IL-12). 
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leave their current positions.97 This tension is particularly 
aggravated when a plaintiff sues not on the basis of an actual 
misappropriation of trade secrets but on the mere threat that it 
might occur.9S The court pointed out that while the I.T.S.A. 
clearly permits a court to enjoin the threat of misappropriation 
of trade secrets, there is little case law in the Illinois courts or 
the Seventh Circuit establishing what constitutes threatened 
or inevitable misappropriation.99 
On reviewing applicable precedent, the PepsiCo court 
found only two Illinois cases addressing the issue of inevitable 
disclosure, Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp.1OO 
and AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker. 101 The court distinguished 
PepsiCo from both of these cases, based on their finding that 
both Teradyne and AMP involved facts too weak to apply the 
theory of inevitable disclosure, and asserted that the facts in 
PepsiCo were compelling. 102 The court reasoned that 
PepsiCo's basis for suspicion rose far above that of the 
Teradyne and AMP plaintiffs. 103 
In Teradyne and AMP, the plaintiffs asserted only that 
skilled employees were taking their skills elsewhere. 104 How-
ever, distinguishing these cases from PepsiCo, the court stated 
that it was not Redmond's general skills and knowledge ac-
quired during his tenure with PepsiCo that PepsiCo sought to 
97. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268. 
98. [d. (emphasis added). 
99. [d. The court refers to inevitable disclosure as inevitable misappropriation 
in an apparent attempt to use the terms synonymously. It is again noted that 
"threatened misappropriation," which is the language in the I.T.S.A., and "inevita-
ble disclosure" are not synonymous. The latter does not require intent. See supra 
note 64. 
100. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268; Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 
707 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989) Teradyne was the first case to discuss the theory 
of inevitable disclosure under the I.T.S.A. In an insightful opinion, Judge Zagel ob-
served that threatened misappropriation can be enjoined under Illinois law where 
there is a high degree of probability of inevitable and immediate use of trade 
secrets. [d.; See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text for analysis of Teradyne. 
101. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269; AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th 
Cir. 1987) Although AMP pre dates the I.T.S.A. it is applicable because the 
I.T.S.A. codifies, rather than modifies, the common law doctrine that preceded it. 
[d.; See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text for analysis of AMP. 
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keep from falling into Quaker's hands. 105 Rather, PepsiCo 
sought to protect only its particularized plans and processes 
developed to give them an advantage over their competi-
tors. 106 These plans, which were unknown to others in the 
industry, were disclosed to Redmond while the employer-em-
ployee relationship existed. l07 
Finally, the PepsiCo court noted that a plaintiff may prove 
a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that 
defendant's new employment will inevitably require him to 
rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets. lOS The court further stat-
ed that the defendants were incorrect that Illinois law does not 
allow a court to enjoin the "inevitable" disclosure of trade se-
crets. 109 
Thus, when the court coupled the demonstrated inevitabil-
ity that Redmond would rely on PepsiCo's trade secrets with 
the validation of the inevitable disclosure theory, it concluded 
that the district court correctly decided that PepsiCo had dem-
onstrated a likelihood of success on its statutory claim of trade 
secret misappropriation.110 The court affirmatively concluded 
that Illinois law allows a court to enjoin the inevitable disclo-
sure of trade secrets, and that an injunction was the appropri-
ate remedy in this case. l1l 
VI. CRITIQUE 
Historically, courts have been reluctant to permit employ-
ers to use a claim of trade secret misappropriation to obtain an 
ex post facto covenants not to compete.112 Courts suspiciously 
regard non-competition agreements because they fear that 
employers will use the agreements as facades to restrict em-
ployee mobility.113 Although courts rule in favor of both em-
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1271. 
111. Id. at 1269. 
112. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 
682-83 (1960). 
113. Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes, 40 STAN. L. 
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ployees and employers, the broad definition of trade secrets 
combined with the use of nondisclosure agreements creates the 
danger of a pro-employer thread in these cases. 114 
In AMP, the Seventh Circuit noted that the hiring of a 
competitor's employee was usually permissible. 115 The court 
further stated that to prevent such action would disservice the 
free market goal of maximizing available resources to foster 
competition. 116 Consequently, this would create an improper 
balance between the purposes of trade secrets law and the 
strong policy in favor of fair and vigorous business competi-
tion.1l7 Yet the holding in PepsiCo appears antithetical to 
this earlier decision. 11s In effect, the court allowed PepsiCo to 
create a fictitious and automatic covenant not to compete. 119 
Companies seeking to prevent former employees from 
working for competitors have been urging adoption of the inev-
itable disclosure theory of trade secret misappropriation in an 
effort to avoid the judicial disfavor and scrutiny applied to 
traditional non-compete agreements. 120 This virtually 
transforms a confidentiality agreement into a non-compete 
agreement. 121 If readily applied by the courts, the inevitable 
disclosure theory could impede an employees' mobility and the 
spread of general knowledge which provides the basis for much 
of the economic growth in many industries. 122 
Often the number of companies for which employees can 
work is limited, and typically these companies are competi-
tors.l23 If employees cannot work in the same competitive ar-
REV. at 523. 
114. Interview with Michael A. Glenn, Attorney at Law, in San Francisco, CA 
(Sept. 15, 1995). 
115. See AMP, 823 F.2d at 1205. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. 
118. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271. 
119. See [d. 
120. Blake, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 682-83 (1960). 
121. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2 
NAT'L L.J. CI0 (1995). 
122. [d.; For a discussion of employees' bargaining power and its relation to 
compensation, See Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 100-01 (1981). 
123. Interview with Michael A. Glenn, Attorney at Law, specializing in intellec-
16
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ea as their current employment, their options for other employ-
ment will be significantly limited.124 In these instances, the 
employee must use his or her skills to find new employment, 
even though some or most of those skills may be unalterably 
tied to the trade secret information of former employers. 125 If 
employees change jobs but remain in the same profession or 
trade, they may find it impossible to avoid drawing upon the 
skills and experience developed at previous jobs.126 Disclosure 
may be nearly inevitable even though employees do not intend 
to appropriate their former employer's trade secrets.127 Ac-
cordingly, employees may not want to increase their expertise, 
since the potential acquisition of alleged trade secrets could 
prevent them from later advantage in the industry in which 
they are most productive. 128 
The protection given to trade secrets is a shield, sanc-
tioned by the courts, for the preservation of trust in confiden-
tial relationships; it must not become a sword used by employ-
ers to retain employees on the threat of rendering them sub-
stantially unemployable in the field of their experience if they 
decide to resign.129 If employees are threatened, "society suf-
fers because competition is diminished by slackening the dis-
semination of ideas, processes and methods.,,130 
On the other hand, intellectual property is often the life-
blood of a company, especially in high technology 
industries. 131 A business certainly has the right to be protect-
ed against unfair competition stemming from the usurpation of 
tual property; and Adjunct Professor of Law at Golden Gate University, School of 
Law; in San Francisco, CA (Sept. 15, 1995). 
124. Id.; Blake, 73 HARv. L. REV. at 683 (1960) ("The mobility of untold num-
bers of employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions whose severity no 
court would sanction."). Id. 
125. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2 
NATL L.J. C12 (1995). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 579, 160 A,2d 430, 435 (1960). 
129. DiBoise and Berger, Getting Around Barriers To Non-Compete Pacts, 2 
NATL L.J. C12 (1995). 
130. Wexler, 399 Pa. at 579. 
131. DiBoise and Berger, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 20 NEW MA'ITER 
at 29 (1995). 
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its trade secrets. 132 As much as a free society supports the 
right of employees to change jobs at will, employers who invest 
significant efforts in the development of valuable trade secrets 
may incur serious losses if this confidential information is 
divulged to competitors by departing employees.133 Without a 
means of post-employment protection to assure that valuable 
developments or improvements are exclusively those of the 
employer, businesses could not afford to subsidize research or 
improve current methods. 134 Additionally, without the theory 
of inevitable disclosure, threatened misappropriation is often 
difficult if not impossible to prove. 135 Finally, courts strongly 
support trade secret protection for employers because they 
view technological innovation favorably, and because they 
believe trade secret protection encourages companies to invest 
in new technology. 136 
However, in forums such as California, where legislation 
declares non-compete agreements unenforceable except in 
limited circumstances, the PepsiCo court's ruling appears to fly 
in the face of legislative intent. 137 In passing California Busi-
ness and Professions Code Section 16600, the state legislature 
has manifested its clear intent to avoid the viability of non-
compete agreements.13B The PepsiCo ruling circumvents this 
legislative intent by transforming a confidentiality agreement 
into a de facto non-compete agreement, thereby bypassing 
Section 16600.139 To allow the PepsiCo holding to control Cal-
ifornia Law would therefore enable courts to avoid clear and 
established legislation. 
132. Wexler, 399 Pa. at 578. 
133. FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, 677 F.2d 500 (1982). 
134. Wexler, 399 Pa. at 579. 
135. Interview with Kevin Patrick McGee, Law Review Editor, in San Francisco, 
CA (Dec. 12, 1995). The only two people that know if the secret has actually been 
exposed are the ex-employee and the new employer. Most trade secret prosecutions 
have to get those two parties to admit or disclose the misappropriation against 
their personal and pecuniary interest. [d. 
136. See, e.g. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). 
137. CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1992). The entirety of the statute 
reads: "Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is 
to that extent void." [d. 
138. See id. See generally, Matull & Associates v. Cloutier, 194 Cal. App. 3d 
1049 (1987); Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic, 143 Cal. App. 2d 385 (1956). 
139. See, JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 13.02 at 13-12. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
One of the most difficult issues in trade secret law in-
volves how to protect the competing interests of employers and 
employees. l40 Employers seek to restrict the disclosure of 
confidential information, whereas employees find that such 
restrictions impair their ability to market their skills to new 
employers.141 While courts support the protection of trade se-
crets, they have traditionally recognized the economic benefits 
of disclosure since other innovative individuals and firms will 
have the opportunity to develop and build upon the new tech-
nology.142 Although the arguments expressed by proponents 
of both sides of this dilemma are understandable, an inevitable 
disclosure theory that allows employers to prevent an employee 
from working for a competitor in the employee's area of exper-
tise for an unlimited amount of time and without any compen-
sation to the employee is a menacing restriction. As Judge 
Learned Hand long ago observed: 
... it has never been thought actionable to take 
away another's employee, when the defendant 
wants to use him in his own business, however 
much the plaintiff may suffer. It is difficult to 
see how servants could get the full value of their 
services on any other terms; time creates no 
140. See supra note 65. 
141. See Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Dissolutions of 
Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988). 
142. See, e.g. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 590. 
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prescriptive right in other men's labor. If an 
employer expects so much, he must secure it by 
[a] contract [not to compete].l43 
Therefore, PepsiCo represents a perilous precedent. 144 
Johanna L. Edelstein· 
143. Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 934 (1929). 
144. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1263. 
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